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I Comments
An Investment to Die For: From Life
Insurance to Death Bonds, the Evolution and
Legality of the Life Settlement Industry
Kelly J. Bozanic*
Profiting from death may strike one as morally offensive, but the life
settlement industry has created just such an opportunity. A life
settlement is a transaction wherein an insured assigns the ownership
interest (contract rights to the death benefit) of a life insurance policy to
an investor for cash consideration. In other words, it is the sale of an
economic interest in the death of the insured. As such, the industry has
created a secondary market for what was once thought to be an illiquid
asset: life insurance. While current market volatility makes an
investment in death attractive, the life settlement industry is not without
pitfalls. This Comment explores the evolution and legality of the industry
as well as considerations for an individual contemplating a life
settlement transaction.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University, 2009; Bachelor of Arts, University of California at Berkeley. I would
like to thank Penn State University Professors Marie T. Reilly, Jeffrey H. Kahn and John
E. Lopatka, for their guidance and generosity in teaching me. I would also like to thank
Robert S. Gascon, CLU, ChFC and Stephan R. Leimberg, Esq., for their mentoring and
feedback with this piece.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The notion that nothing is sacred in the commodities markets is a
criticism of a capitalist economy.' The American way is to turn a profit
wherever one can, and the life settlement industry is proving true to this
form.2 The life settlement industry has cultivated a secondary market for
life insurance policies, 3 offering policy owners the option of exchanging
their ownership in the policy for cash consideration. As a result, the
industry has, effectively, commodified death.4 Instead of trading on
earnings reports and forecasts, investors in life settlements trade on life
expectancy. In today's climate of market instability and investment
skepticism, an asset uncorrelated to market fluctuations (death) is an
attractive, and some would say essential, addition to any portfolio.
5
This Comment surveys the evolution of the life settlement industry
and offers considerations for an individual contemplating the sale of his
6
life insurance policy. In the author's opinion, the life settlement industry
is the invisible hand 7 at its best, moving assets in a free market to their
highest and best use. To the unwary, however, the market for life
settlements can be a dangerous frontier. A life settlement is, essentially,
the sale of an economic interest in a life.8 Absent consumer education,
careful scrutiny by a policy owner's financial advisors and consumer
1. See, e.g., Ellen Kelleher, Cash in on the American Way of Death, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 12, 2007, Weekend Money, at 10; Joseph Treaster, Death Benefits, Now
for the Living, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, § 3, 1; cf KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOL. 1, 927-
29 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1992) (1867).
2. See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10; Saul Friedman, Gray Matters; How Some
Cash in When Others Cash Out, NEWSDAY (New York), May 5, 2007, at B 11; Treaster,
supra note 1, at § 3, 1.
3. For the purposes of this Comment, any reference to life insurance will exclude
term (or temporary) insurance. The nature of term insurance makes it less attractive as an
investment; should an insured outlive the term of the policy, the investor has no hope of
realizing any return.
4. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, AIDS Drugs Alter An Industry's Math;
Recalculating Death-Benefit Deals, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at Dl.
5. See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Your Money or Your Life Insurance?, THE WASH.
POST, May 13, 2001, at H02; Fabrice Taylor, Invest In A Sure Thing - Death; Paying
Cash Now for Life Insurance Policies that "Mature" Later Benefits Almost Everyone,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), Sept. 30, 2005, at 29.
6. For simplicity and readability in this Comment, the masculine pronoun will be
used in all cases and is designated to encompass both feminine and masculine.
7. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 572 (Edwin Carman ed., Random
House 2003) (1776) (Smith posited that legislation should not interfere with contracts and
that, by leaving contracts to the individual, interests would move to their highest and best
use).
8. See Liam Pleven & Rachel Emma Silverman, Cashing In: An Insurance Man
Builds a Lively Business in Death, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2007, at Al ("[A life
settlement] lets investors essentially bet on-and profit from-other people's demise.").
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protective state laws, this industry is rife with potential for abuse and
fraudulent activity. 9 Yet when the transactions are legitimate and entered
into with full disclosure of the consequences, a life settlement can be a
great way to gain liquidity from an otherwise illiquid asset. 10
Part I of this Comment explains the metamorphosis of a life
insurance policy" from a contract providing security in the event of an
untimely death into a security traded on the commodities markets. Case
law 12 and common law property rights 13 legitimate this evolved use of a
life insurance policy, so long as all parties adhere to the insurable interest
requirements and relevant settlement laws.' 4  Part II looks at the
insurable interest laws unique to life insurance and the policy behind
these laws as it pertains to a life settlement. Insurable interest ensures
that a life insurance policy is not initiated as a wagering contract on
human life; the requirement of insurable interest is satisfied when (1) the
individual purchasing the insurance policy has a greater pecuniary
interest in the continued life of the insured rather than in the insured's
death, and (2) the purchaser lacks intent to sell the policy on the
secondary market. 15
Part III of this Comment analyzes the right to alienate a life
insurance policy. A life settlement, in and of itself, does not abuse the
insurance laws. 16 Selling a life insurance policy to a party lacking a
pecuniary interest in the life of the insured, however, is a risk that the
insured must assess before agreeing to a life settlement.' 7 From a policy
standpoint, the interests of promoting the free market and affirming
individual property rights outweigh the paternalistic view that the
government is in the better position to determine what risks an individual
ought to take. 18 The assumption of risk for economic gain is a personal
decision that should be left to the individual. 9
Part IV of this Comment explains key considerations an individual
must take into account when contemplating a life settlement. In addition
9. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.b.
10. See discussion infra Parts II.A.3, IlI.B.2.c.
11. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 380 (2007) ("The written instrument, in which a
contract of insurance is set forth, is the policy.") (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 157 (1911) (holding that the sale of a
life insurance policy to a third-party lacking insurable interest is valid).
13. See, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ. Co. v. AT&T Corp., 320 F.3d 1081, 1091
(10th Cir. 2003) (noting absolute restraints on alienation of contract rights were against
public policy as unreasonable incursions on the free flow of commerce).
14. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
15. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
16. Id.
17. See discussion infra Part III.B. I.d.
18. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
19 Id
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to appreciating the risk of vesting a third-party with an interest in the
insured's death,2 ° there are financial implications for this transaction.
First, a life settlement is the sale of a contract right; it is a disposition of
property. 21  Unlike the death benefits of a life insurance policy,
22
proceeds from a life settlement will be treated as taxable gain.23 Second,
a life settlement is not the only way to extract liquidity from an existing
life insurance policy.24 Because the death benefits of a life insurance
policy are excluded from the gross income of the beneficiary, 5 the
policy is a valuable estate planning mechanism, and its worth should be
seriously appraised before devising the interest therein.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the Life Settlement Industry
1. The Viatical Era
The life settlement industry evolved from a practice called a
"viatical settlement, 27 which began in the 1980s at the height of the
HIV-AIDS epidemic. 28 The sympathy engendered by suffering and
financially-constrained 29 HIV-AIDS victims was fertile ground for the
creation of a new investment opportunity: a secondary market for life
insurance.30 A viatical settlement enabled the owner3' of a life insurance
20. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.d.
21. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
22. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2008) (excluding death benefit from gross income of
beneficiary when paid by reason of death of the insured).
23. See discussion infra Part III.C.I.
24. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
25. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2008).
26. See discussion infra Part III.C.2; see generally HOWARD ZARITSKY & STEPHAN
LEIMBERG, TAx PLANNING WITH LIFE INSURANCE: ANALYSIS AND FORMS (2d ed. RIA
Group 2008); STEPHAN R. LEIMBERG & ROBERT J. DOYLE, JR., TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
OF LIFE INSURANCE PLANNING (4th ed. Nat'l Underwriter Co. 2007).
27. See Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) ("A
viatical settlement, by which a dying person is able to acquire provisions for the
remainder of his life's journey by selling his life insurance policy, is thus thought to
provide a viaticum."); Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, 93 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting "viatical" is derived from the Latin word "viaticum," which means provision for
the journey).
28. See John Tierney, The Big City; In 80's, Fear Spread Faster Than AIDS, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2001, at B1.
29. See Arthur Allen, As They Lay Dying, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1996,
Magazine, at 13.
30. While a secondary market for life insurance has existed for well over a century,
see Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 157 (1911), the viatical settlement industry paved
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policy held on the life of a terminally ill patient3l to sell the policy to a
third party for a cash settlement.33 The value of the settlement offer was
based on the face value34 of the policy, the expected mortality of the
insured, and the amount of cash build-up in the policy. 35 The new third-
party policy owner would pay the premiums to sustain the policy until
the death of the insured, and so, the sooner the insured was expected to
die, the higher the settlement offer was likely to be.36 A viatical
settlement gave a terminally ill patient an immediate infusion of cash,
which was usually necessary for medical expenses.37
As the new policy owner, the third-party investor would designate
himself as the policy's beneficiary.38 At the insured's death, the investor
would realize his profit by collecting the policy's death benefit.39 If all
parties were honest, a viatical settlement would benefit all those
involved: the settlement would provide a benefit to victims of terminal
illnesses by providing liquidity from an otherwise illiquid asset, and it
would be a boon to investors; after all, death is certain. While public
policy arguments favored viatical settlements, the transaction did not
the way for a mainstream adoption of this investment opportunity. See Matthew
Goldstein, Profiting From Mortality, BuS.WK., July 30, 2007, at 44.
31. The owner may or may not be the insured. See Friedman, supra note 2, at B 11.
32. See I.R.C. § 101(g)(4)(A) (2008) ("[A terminally ill patient is] an individual who
has been certified by a physician as having an illness or physical condition which can
reasonably be expected to result in death in twenty-four months or less after the date of
the certification.").
33. The cash settlement is an amount higher than the policy's surrender value but
lower than the death benefit. See Friedman, supra note 2, at B 11.
A life insurance policy has a dual-nature. As with the purchase of a personal home,
a life insurance policy has both a personal-consumption component (insurance coverage,
which has been "consumed" at the end of each year the insured is still living) and an
investment component (tax-deferred cash build-up). See generally LEIMBERG & DOYLE,
JR., supra note 26. Courts have long affirmed this dual nature of life insurance. See, e.g.,
London Shoe Co. v. Comm'r, 80 F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 663
(1936) (relying on Lovell v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 264, 274 (1884), and
noting that a life insurance policy ordinarily combines investment with insurance
protection); Century Wood Preserving Co. v. Comm'r, 69 F.2d 967, 968 (3d Cir. 1934)
("The policies of insurance here have a double aspect. They provide a present protection
of ordinary life insurance and also a means of investment.").
34. The face value of a life insurance policy refers to the value of the contracted for
death benefit. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (7th ed. 1999) ("The amount payable
under an insurance policy. Also termed face value; face amount insured by the policy;
face of policy.").
35. See Janet Kidd Stewart, Get Savvy Before You Sell Your Life Insurance Policy,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2006, at C6.
36. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 29, at 13; Phyllis Furman, Who's Cashing in Your
Chips? Selling off Life Insurance policies to Raise Money Grows in Popularity, DAILY
NEWS (New York), July 30, 2007, Money, at 4.
37. See id.; Dunlap, supra note 4, at D1.
38. See, e.g., Treaster, supra note 1, at § 3, 1.
39. Id.
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need to be legitimated on policy grounds. The Supreme Court validated
the resale of a life insurance policy to a third-party a century prior in
Grigsby v. Russell.
40
Although the practice of viatical settlements is not inherently
flawed, two issues emerged which would prove fatal to the industry.
First, improvements in medical care made mortality assumptions more
difficult to approximate.4' Second, lack of regulation and the motive for
profit gave way to fraudulent activity which made viatical settlements a
less sound, and ultimately, disfavored investment.42
a. Improvements in Medical Treatment Made Death Rates More
Difficult to Approximate
Improvements in medical treatment have made HIV-AIDS a
"medically managed chronic condition, 4 3 causing a delay in death
benefit collection for investors. With HIV-AIDS patients living longer,
investors were less willing to purchase their life insurance policies, and
the industry began to shrink.44 In response, viatical investors sought
growth by refocusing marketing efforts on individuals with other
terminal illnesses. 5  Despite the expansion of the target market,
calculating accurate mortality assumptions for other terminal patients
46was not any easier.
Viatical settlement offers varied from eighty percent of the policy
face value, when the insured had six months or less to live, to less than
fifty percent of the policy face value, when the insured was expected to
die within twenty-four months.4 7  An insured who lived a mere few
months longer than expected wreaked havoc on investors' rates of return.
The more an investor had to pay on the policy, 48 the less gain the investor
40. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911) (upholding right to sell
ownership of life insurance policy to third party; finding that alienation of ownership is a
basic property right).
41. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at Dl.
42. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 5, at H02; Taylor, supra note 5, at 29.
43. Dunlap, supra note 4, at Dl (quoting Dr. Mervyn F. Silverman, former president
of the American Foundation for AIDS Research).
44. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at Dl.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Treaster, supra note 1, at § 3, 1 ("For investment companies, profits
depend on the ability to handicap death.").
47. Id.
48. To keep the policy from lapsing, premiums had to be paid until the death of the
insured. See Treaster, supra note 1, at § 3, 1. "[Investor's] profit is the difference
between what they pay out and the death benefit, which goes to them when the insured
person dies.... Anyone who lives beyond his estimated time of death begins to cut into
the profits of the buyer." Id.
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realized from the eventual payout of the death benefit.49 Because of the
difficulty in predicting rates of return, the viatical settlement industry
began to decline almost in tandem with advancements in medicine.50
b. Fraud in the Viatical Settlement Industry Necessitated
Regulatory Oversight
The occurrence of better-than-expected longevity was not the only
reason insureds were not dying "as expected.",51 Unscrupulous doctors
and willing insureds perpetrated fraud on insurance companies and
investors by making mortality expectations seem worse on paper than
they were in actuality.52 Investors quickly realized this trend and began
to view viatical settlements as riskier than they once thought.53
Regulatory oversight seemed necessary to help inhibit these fraudulent
practices and to allay the fear that potential agents of viatical settlement
investors would emerge to make sure an insured "dies on time.",
5 4
2. Regulating the Viatical Settlement Industry
In 1993, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC") 55 adopted the Viatical Settlements Model Act ("Model Act")
in an effort to regulate the growth of the industry.56 The Model Act
requires that the viatical settlement provider must be licensed to sell life
49. See id.; see also Dunlap, supra note 4, at D1.
50. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at D1.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 5, at H02; Taylor, supra note 5, at 29.
53. Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10 ("[T]he greatest risk [to investors] is that sellers of
policies will live longer than expected.").
54. Friedman, supra note 2, at B 11 ("Said Steve Leimberg, a Pennsylvania financial
advisor: How well would you sleep at night knowing that your life insurance is owned by
Tony Soprano and his rate of return will depend on how quickly you die?") (internal
quotes omitted); cf Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881) (stating that where the
party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the insured, such policies
have a tendency to create a "desire for the event").
55. Established in 1871, the NAIC is comprised of the insurance commissioners
from each of the fifty states. See NAIC.org, About the NAIC, http://www.naic.org/
index.about.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). Because the states have not delegated
authority to the NAIC, the body is not vested with regulatory power over the states. Id.
The NAIC does, however, publish model acts, which the states may choose to adopt, and
it is responsible for establishing the statutory insurance accounting principles. Id.
56. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs
2006). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) developed the
current Viatical Settlements Model Act and Regulation over eleven years, from 1993 to
2004 (the Model), some version of which has been adopted by as many as forty states.
See Jennifer K. Schroeder, United States: Developments in Life Settlement Regulation,
MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, June 20, 2006, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=40520.
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insurance in the state where the insured resides.57 If the state does not
issue a life insurance license, the Model Act requires the viator 58 to
comply with certain disclosure requirements. 59 The goal of the Model
Act is to inhibit fraudulent transactions and ensure accountability
through a regulated market.60
In 1996, Congress followed suit by passing the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). When an insured is
terminally or chronically ill, HIPAA excludes from taxable income the
proceeds from the sale of their life insurance policy to a viatical
settlement provider.6' This provision afforded viators the same tax-
exempt status of the viatical settlement payment as the death benefit
payout would be to the beneficiary.62 Section 101(g) of the Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC") incorporated guidelines from the NAIC Model
63Act as preconditions to enjoying this preferred tax treatment.
Increased regulation may have helped to allay fear of fraudulent
investor activity, but the problem of mortality prediction with terminal
patients remained.64 Yet, in spite of the volatility of investors' profits
caused by unpredictable mortality, attraction to the idea of investing in
death remained high.65 An interest in death is desirable for its
independence from market covariance: death rates are not affected by
changes in federal interest rates or earnings reports.66 Investors found a
way to reduce their risk and maintain their ability to profit from mortality
57. See VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 3 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs
2006); VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 3 (2004). Currently twenty-six
states have licensing requirements for viatical and life settlement providers. See
Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44.
58. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) ("In the
language of the industry, the insured is the viator who sells his policy at a discount to a
provider of the viaticum.") (internal quotes omitted).
59. Section 8 of the Model Act requires the viatical settlement provider to make
extensive disclosures to the viator, and section 9 regulates the settlement process and
post-sale relationship of the provider and the viator. See VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL
ACT §§ 8-9 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2006).
60. See Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 299.
61. I.R.C. § 101(g)(1) (2008).
62. Compare I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2008) (excluding death benefits from beneficiary's
gross income if paid by reason of the death of the insured) with I.R.C. § 101(g)(2) (2008)
(treating viatical settlement as an amount paid by reason of the death of insured).
63. See Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 299-300 (noting Congress extended tax benefits to
viators who complied with safeguards of the Model Act and Regulations and also
indicating Congressional concern with the "pitfalls" of an unregulated viatical market).
64. See Arthur Fliegelman, Psst! Wanna Buy a Used Life Insurance Policy?,
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., Feb. 2006, 96492.
65. See Treaster, supra note 1, at § 3, 1.
66. "[Death] is an asset class that isn't going away." Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44
(quoting David Dorr, president and CEO of Life-Exchange Inc.).
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by targeting the next most obvious market: senior-citizens, or the senior
market.67
3. The Senior Market and the Birth of Life Settlements
For over two centuries, the life insurance industry has employed
actuarial science to determine the premium-structure of life insurance
policies.68 The same data is now being "recycled" and used in life
insurance's secondary market. 69 Applied to the senior market, actuarial
science enables investors to achieve more accurate mortality
expectations.7 ° This increased accuracy makes the rates of return in the
senior market more predictable than the market for terminal patients.7'
Because of more predictable rates of return, the transaction, now called a
life settlement,72 carries lower risk than a viatical settlement.73 The
investment risk in life settlements is tied only to accuracy in mortality
predictions, which, because of actuarial data, is more accurately
impounded into the value of the settlement offer.74 With expected yields
that are high and risk levels that are relatively low, the life settlement
industry offers investors a way to diversify risk in their portfolios
without the market covariance associated with most investments.75
67. See Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44; Rebecca Knight, A Safer Way of Dicing with
Death, FIN. TIMES (London), March 5, 2005, at 24.
68. See Joanna Chung & Gillian Tett, Death and the Salesmen, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 24, 2007, at 26 (outlining history of actuarial science in issuing government backed
bonds, a practice that gradually became part of the life insurance industry).
69. Knight, supra note 67, at 24 (noting that Axis Capital Management's hedge fund
utilizes an underwriting company to determine when people will die).
70. Id.
71. Currently, there is no "miracle cure" for old age. Because a huge amount of data
is available to actuarial scientists, mortality assumptions for seniors are far easier to
predict than in the case of individuals suffering a disease or other illness. See Kelleher,
supra note 1, at 10.
72. Life settlements are distinct from viatical settlements, which solely refer to a
transaction for the contract rights to the death benefit of a terminally ill individual,
though both viatical and life settlements are governed by the VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS
MODEL ACT. See Jennifer K. Schroeder, United States: Fourth Circuit Rules That
Virginia Viatical Settlement Regulation Does Not Violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, June 24, 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=49378.
73. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
74. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10; see also Kimberly Miller, Donor Pitches Life
Insurance to Raise FA U Millions, PALM BEACH POST, May 2, 2007 at 1 A.
75. In the author's opinion, investing in life settlements is an inspired idea; when
you get past the ghoulishness of it, everyone will surely die. See Goldstein, supra note
30, at 44; Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
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4. The Emergence of "Death Bonds," Securitizing Life
Settlement Pools
Wall Street has introduced the most recent, and perhaps intriguing,
development in the life settlement industry.76 Though understandably
cautious, 77 investment banks are creating a quasi-bond out of life
settlements by securitizing them.7 8 This macabre investment is known as
a "Death Bond," though the technical-and less chilling-label is a "life-
settlement backed security. 79
Securitization is a structured finance process whereby illiquid assets
(payment obligations) are transformed into liquid assets (securities).80 In
the case of a life insurance policy, the payment obligation is the
insurance company's promise to pay the contracted-for death benefit
upon the death of the insured.8 ' Securitization of life insurance policies
can be understood as a three-step process. First, a financial intermediary,
typically an investment bank, acquires a series of life insurance policies
through life settlements. 82  Recall that what is acquired in a life
settlement is the payment obligation (a contract right) of the death
benefit upon death of the insured. Second, the policies are aggregated by
risk into a pool; risk is measured, inter alia, by the mortality expectation
of the insureds. 83 Finally, the pool is divided into fractional interests
(securities), and sold to investors.84 Due to the law of large numbers,85
76. See Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44.
77. See id. (noting the desire of firms to keep a low profile until there is more
legitimacy associated with the market); id. ("[Goldman Sachs] is quietly building up its
own subsidiary under the nondescript name Eastport Capital.").
78. See id. Securitization is a structured finance process by which payment
obligations are acquired, classified into pools, and fractional interests therein are offered
to investors. See S.L. SCHWARCZ, B. MARKELL & L.L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION,
STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS § 1 (Lexis Nexis 2004).
79. Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44.
80. See SCHWARCZ, MARKELL, & BROOME, supra note 78, at § 1.
81. A life insurance policy is a contract-the promise to pay an annual premium is
given in consideration for the insurance company's promise to pay a benefit upon the
death of the insured. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44; Treaster, supra note 1, at § 3, 1.
83. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44; Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
84. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44; Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
85. The law of large numbers is a statistical theorem which asserts that the long-term
stability of a random variable can be approximated given a sample of independent and
identically distributed random variables with a finite expected value. See Ocean Drilling
& Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal
citations omitted) (noting that through the law of large numbers, insurance reduces risk in
a common fund). With respect to life settlements, this means that the larger the amount
of data (death rates) available to actuaries, the more accurate their mortality assumptions
will become, which in turn, will result in a smooth income stream for investors in life
settlement pools. For reading on the law of large numbers generally, see GEOFFREY
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the bundling of risk across many policies and subsequent allocation to
many investors, no one investor is unduly exposed to excess risk as he
has only a fractional interest in one specific individual's life.8 6 All
investors enjoy an interest in an asset that generates a smooth stream of
income as insureds die and their life insurance policies pay off.
87
As discussed above, 88 a life settlement-backed security is not
subject to market volatility, and as mortality assumptions improve, life
settlement-backed securities' rates of return will rise. 89 An increase in
rates of return will make the industry even more attractive to private and
institutional investors seeking to hedge against the uncertainties of assets
highly correlated with the market. 90 With industry growth, the potential
for abuse and other legal issues also rises, making regulatory oversight
necessary.91
B. The Legal Implications of Life Settlements
The life settlement market grew out of the remnants of the viatical
market, and while the transactions are inherently distinct,92 they raise
many of the same legal issues. The first issue is the potential for fraud.
93
The second issue is the circumvention of the insurable interest laws.
94
The third issue is whether the sale of a life insurance policy is contrary to
public policy and should be restricted. The fourth issue is the proper tax
treatment of a life settlement transaction.95 This Comment now delves
into the analysis of these issues.
GRIMMETT & DAVID STIRZAKER, PROBABILITY AND RANDOM PROCESSES, (2d ed., Oxford
University Press 1992).
86. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44; Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
87. According to Business Week, the return is steady at eight percent. See
Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44; see also Matthew Vincent, A Matter of Life and Death in
the Market, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 7, 2007, at 5.
88. See discussion supra Part II.A.2; see also sources cited supra notes 66-67.
89. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
90. The growth of the life settlement industry is astonishing. In fact, it is estimated
that by 2030, the market for life settlement-backed securities will be a $160 billion a
year. See Kelleher, supra note 1, at 10.
91. See Ronald Panko, Growth of Life Settlements Tied to Accountability, A.M.
BESTWIRE, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.lisassociation.org/vlsaamembers/news/files/v
saanews A.M._BestCompany.21 Nov_2005_Growth of LifeSettlementsTied.htm.
92. See discussion infra Part III.C.I.
93. See discussion infra Part III.A.
94. See discussion infra Part III.B.I.
95. See discussion infra Part III.C.I.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Fraudulent Practice of Stranger-Originated Life Insurance
("STOLI") and the Risk Associated with STOLI in Life Settlement-
Backed Securities
On the surface, the high expected returns and low risk associated
with a life settlement and a life settlement-backed security seem like an
investor's dream. The life settlement industry has not been plagued by
the same difficulties in mortality prediction and blatant dishonesty of
doctors and insureds that the viatical settlement industry experienced.
96
The life settlement industry, however, has its own latent risks which are
just now coming to light. As the saying goes, "pigs get fat, but hogs get
slaughtered." The "hogs" of the life settlement industry are those who
seek fraudulent ways of expanding the market.
97
1. The Supply-Constraints of the Life Settlement Market Give
Way to STOLI
The life settlement market is considered supply-constrained,
because there are a limited number of life insurance policies available for
sale.98 An investor seeking to increase the supply of life insurance
policies available for sale on the secondary market can only do so
through fraudulent means: inducement. 99 By inducing0 0 senior-citizens
96. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
97. The source of this maxim is unclear, though its meaning is sound. A pig is
understood to be someone who pushes the proverbial envelope and benefits, whereas a
hog is understood to be someone who crosses the line and ends up paying a dear price.
98. At any given time, the market for life settlement is constrained by the following
factors: policies on senior-citizens over seventy, policies that have been owned for at
least two years, and policies that have a face value in excess of $100,000. See Suneet
Kamath & Timothy Sledge, Life Insurance Long View-Life Settlements Need Not Be
Unsettling, BERNSTEIN RES. CALL, Mar. 4, 2005, at 8. These constraints are not mandated
by statute, but are the generally accepted parameters in order for the policy to be worth
more to an investor in the secondary market than its cash surrender value to an insured.
Id. In spite of this, estimates put the life settlement industry at upwards of $160 billion
by 2030. Id.
99. See, e.g., Stephan Leimberg, Stranger Originated Life Insurance: A Free Lunch
Or A Prelude To Acid Indigestion?, FORTY-FIRST ANN. HECKERLING INS. ON EST. PLAN.,
§ 4 (Matthew Bender 2007); J. Alan Jensen & Stephan Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life
Insurance: A Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 ACTEC J. 110, 110 (2007).
100. Instances of inducement have involved offers of cruises, theater tickets and
"free" insurance coverage for the two years. See Goldstein, supra note 30, at 44.
Inducements offered in originating a STOLI policy have yet to be challenged as
violations of the insurance anti-rebating statutes. Anti-rebating statutes in some states
make it a felony to offer any inducement to acquire insurance. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE
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to take out a life insurance policy on their life with the intention of later
selling their interest in the policy to the investor, an investor is able to
reduce the supply constraint. This practice is known as stranger-
originated life insurance ("STOLI"), and is nothing more than a collusive
attempt to skirt the insurable interest laws.
10 1
2. STOLI Violates the Insurable Interest Laws
Life insurance cannot be purchased with the intent to later sell it to
an individual lacking insurable interest. 102 A life insurance policy must
be bought in good faith, and a STOLI policy, by definition, is not so
conceived. The key is to determine who initiates the purchase of the life
insurance policy and for what purpose. As the Supreme Court noted in
Grigsby v. Russell, a policy that is incepted under the "cloak" of
insurable interest, when there actually is none, is a wagering contract on
human life and is void as a contravention of public policy.10 3 Those who
are caught participating in this practice should be penalized as criminals
engaging in insurance fraud, a felony in most jurisdictions.
10 4
§ 750 (2007) ("Any person who offers, delivers, receives, or accepts any rebate, refund,
commission, or other consideration, whether in the form of money or otherwise, as
compensation or inducement to or from any person for the referral or procurement of
clients, cases, patients, or customers, is guilty of a crime.") (emphasis added).
A thorough analysis of the anti-rebating statutes is beyond the scope of this
Comment, though it is the author's position that individuals participating in STOLI
practices as either insureds or investors ought to be punished to the fullest extent of the
law. In light of anti-rebate statutes, additional criminal sanctions may be imputed to an
investor engaging in any such offerings of benefits as inducement to insurance.
101. The requirement of insurable interest is discussed in detail infra Part III.B. 1. For
an in-depth look at the implications of STOLI, see Leimberg, supra note 99 at § 4.
102. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911) ("[C]ases in which a person
having an interest lends himself to one without any as a cloak to what is in its inception a
wager have no similarity to those where an honest contract is sold in good faith."); Life
Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying
judgment on pleadings in life settlement case when issue is intent of the decedent insured
in procuring life policy); see also discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
103. See Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156.
Only one who obtains a life insurance policy on himself "on his own initiative"
and in good faith-that is, with a genuine intent to obtain insurance protection
for a family member, loved one, or business partner, rather than an intent to
disguise what would otherwise be a gambling transaction by a stranger on his
life-may freely assign the policy to one who does not have an insurable
interest in him.
Life Prod. Clearing LLC, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 653.
104. If insurance fraud is not reason enough, there are many other reasons why
STOLI should not be entertained by an individual, no matter how great the inducement
by the investor seemingly is. A critical assessment of the negative side-effects of STOLI
on an individual's financial health is outside the scope of this Comment, but for more
information, see Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 99, at 110.
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3. The Impact of STOLI on Investors in Life Settlement-Backed
Securities
The impact of STOLI on investors in securitized pools becomes
even more complicated. An investor in a life settlement pool is several
steps removed from the policy creation stage. 10 5 Because an investor is
removed, discovering the risk associated with STOLI is difficult, not to
mention costly, to obtain. Traditionally, the issuer and underwriter of a
security have the duty to discover latent risk in the offering of securities
through the use of a credit rating agency. 10 6  In the case of life
settlement-backed securities, however, credit rating agencies (as well as
state regulatory bodies) presently lack reliable current and historic data
with which to estimate the probability or magnitude of risk associated
with STOLI loss. 10 7 When the difficulties of assessing STOLI risk are
coupled with the necessity of the application of actuarial science for
predictions regarding payment obligations (death benefits),10 8 a life
settlement pool seems uniquely difficult to value. Like the problems of
sub-prime default in the mortgage industry's tranches'0 9 of mortgage-
backed investments,1 10 the possibility that some or all of the payment
105. While most investors in a life settlement pool are institutions, and not
individuals, discovering STOLI is still a difficult task. See Goldstein, supra note 30, at
44. For the purpose of understanding the difficulty of an investor discovering STOLI,
note that there are several links in this transaction chain. STOLI begins with an
individual (owner) who purchases a policy with the intent to re-sell to an investor. The
owner then engages in a life settlement transaction, usually with a life settlement
company (LSC). The third link is when the LSC sells the same policy to an intermediary
who becomes the "issuer." The issuer aggregates several policies and arranges for an
"underwriter" to rate and transfer fractional interests in the aggregated pool (the life
settlement-backed securities). The transfer (by sale or otherwise) of the interests in the
pool is the fourth link. This explanation is over-simplified, but it illustrates the point that
a purchaser of a life settlement-backed security is far removed from the initial fraud of
STOLI. See SCHWARCZ, MARKELL, & BROOME, supra note 79, at § 1.
106. See id. at § 14.
107. STOLI risk raises a sui generis issue for the rating agencies, because STOLI
does not correlate with other market trend indicators. STOLI risk is latent in the policies
themselves and it is not tied to market performance. See Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow
Riskier and Investors are Attracted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at Cl (discussing credit
rating agencies sensitivity to fluctuations in default rates).
108. Contrast this with default rates on home mortgages as to which there is a
mountain of data smoothed out over millions of individual obligations that make
predictions about default risk ranges (e.g., prime v. sub-prime) relatively easy and cheap.
109. See, e.g., Edward Yardini, Global Wealth Will Act as an Economic Shock
Absorber, FrN. TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 2007, at 36 (explaining the "tranche warfare"
that is occurring with respect to investments backed by mortgage payment obligations
and the sub-prime market).
110. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Mortgage Losses Slam Irvine Broker, L.A. TIMES,
June 22, 2007, at C3 (discussing problems with securities backed by mortgage payment
obligations).
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rights in a pool of life insurance policies are STOLI, is latent risk to a life
settlement-backed security investor."' The risk is that if the interest
from which the security derives its value fails," 2 either the issuer of the
security or the investor, or both, will have to absorb the loss."H3 If a life
insurance company successfully challenges the validity of a policy on the
ground that it was purchased with the intention of re-selling it, the policy
will be deemed void ab initio 1 14 If a STOLI policy gets securitized, and
its STOLI nature exposed by the insurer, it will negatively impact the
pool in which it is securitized." 5
111. Life settlement-backed securities are analogous to securities backed by mortgage
obligations issued by a REIT (real-estate investment trust). See Goldstein, supra note 30.
The difference is in the nature of the underlying income-generating asset. In the case of
life settlement-backed securities, the securitized asset is the insurer's obligation to pay
benefits to the insureds' assignees when the insured dies. In the case of securities backed
by mortgage obligations, the securitized asset is the borrowers' obligation to pay home
mortgage debt to retail mortgage issuers. See Charles Stone & Anne Zissu, Securitization
of Senior Life Settlements: Managing Extension Risk, 13 J. DERIVATIVES 66 (2006)
(proposing model by which life settlement-backed securities can be valued, but this
model does not account for STOLI).
112. Meaning the insurer refuses to pay the death benefit on account of fraud, e.g.,
STOLI.
113. When an interest ("bond") in a pool of life settlement-backed securities is
purchased, the investor is purchasing the issuer's promise to pay a fixed payout over
time. See SCHWARCZ, MARKELL, & BROOME, supra note 79, at 71-73. If the pool does
not yield what the issuer thought it would (due to STOLI or other fraud), then the positive
difference between the payout obligation and the pay in (purchase price of the bonds)
shrinks and this loss is borne by the issuer. Id. If, however, the terms of the bond
provide for a reduction in payout if the pool is later found to be infected with STOLI,
then the investors will bear the loss, because their payout will decline. Id. Put another
way, who bears the loss of STOLI depends on the terms of the bonds and ultimately on
the solvency of the issuer. Id.
114. Most state insurance laws provide that an insurance carrier is the only party with
standing to challenge a lack of insurable interest. See, e.g., Rice v. Wal-Mart Stores,
2003 D.N.H. 166, 166 (D.N.H. 2003) ("New Hampshire embraces the majority rule that
'only the insurer can raise the object of want of insurable interest."' (citing Couch on
Insurance, 3 Couch § 41:5 (3d ed. 1995))).
115. While it is true that all investments have risk, the risk associated with STOLI
policies is different. Risk in the stock market is understood at the time of investment,
even stocks which consistently perform well are bound to have bad days. As with
securities backed by mortgage obligations tied to the sub-prime market, however, the
issue is the lack of transparency in the front-end of the transaction. Investors in the same
type of security pool may come to find that their payouts are different on account of the
nature of the underlying payment obligations. See John Spencer et al., Monte Carlo
Round Table-Soft Market Strategies, REINSURANCE MAG., Oct. 2, 2007, at 22 (noting
increased transparency in the mortgage industry may help market stability).
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4. Regulatory Response to STOLI in the Life Settlement Industry
a. NAIC Amendments to the Viatical Settlement Model Act are
Criticized
The NAIC responded to the STOLI issue by amending the NAIC's
Model Act to specifically target the practice of STOLI. 1 6 However, the
amendments have drawn staunch criticism from proponents of the life
settlement industry. 17 The amendments are criticized as being over-
broad," 8 because they subject all individuals who utilize premium
financing' 19 in acquiring life insurance to regulation as viatical
settlements; meaning, the ban on reselling the policy to an investor is
extended from two to five years. 120  The effect of this classification is
argued to be a burden on the free alienation of property. 12' As
convincing as that argument may seem, it is inaccurate. In fact, the
amendments do allow settlements after only two years even when
premium financing is utilized in several instances. 122 A policy may be
settled after two years if the loan financing the policy is based on solely
116. See, e.g., Jim Connolly, Are Today's Battle's Dji Vu All Over Again?, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, April 30, 2007, at 27.
117. See Scott Cipinko, A Big Hole in the NAIC's New Viatical Model Amendments,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, April 30, 2007, at 79; Stephan L. Washington, The NAIC's
Proposed Amended Viatical Settlements Act, CAL. BROKER MAG., June 2007,
http ://calbrokermag.com/Magazine/story/j uneO7/washington.htm.
118. Doug Head, speaking as the executive director of the Life Insurance Settlement
Association (LISA) says, "[The amendments are] an attack on consumer rights and
protections, they sweep everyone into a regulatory net. STOLI abuse is cause for
concern, but the abuse should be dealt with through targeted, well-crafted regulation, not
through an overarching rollback of consumer rights." Telephone interview with Doug
Head, Executive Director, Life Insurance Settlement Association, in Orlando, Fla. (Jan.
21, 2008) [hereinafter Head Interview].
119. Premium financing is a method of funding the purchase of life insurance for
those individuals who have high net worth, but who either do not have or do not want to
use liquid capital to pay the premiums on a policy. Telephone Interview with Robert S.
Gascon, CLU, ChFC, Regional Director, Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, in
Irvine, Cal. (Oct. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Gascon Interview I]. Premium financing plans
allow a policy owner to borrow the money to pay the life insurance premiums, thus
keeping capital free to be used more efficiently elsewhere. Id. Collateral for the loan
usually consists of personal assets and can be reduced over time by cash accumulated
within the policy being financed. Because STOLI is often acquired using investor-
financing, it was presumed additional inquiries on all policies so acquired would abate
the practice of STOLI. Id.
120. See, e.g., Washington, supra note 117.
121. See, e.g., Jim Connolly, New York Superintendent Dinallo Pressing For Change
On Many Fronts, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 18, 2007, at 7.
122. See Open Letter from Stephan R. Leimberg, Esq., CEO, Leimberg Information
Services Inc., President, Leimberg Associates, Inc., to Illinois Legislators (March 2008)
(on file with author).
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the policy's cash surrender value, no life expectancy evaluation has been
made by investors, and there has been no "agreement or understanding to
settle."' 123 Furthermore, there is no wait for settlement if the status of the
insured changes, e.g., the insured is diagnosed with a terminal illness, is
predeceased by a spouse, retires, has a change in marital status or
becomes disabled. 24  Additionally, the amendment imposes no
moratorium on a life settlement of a policy when the policy owner uses
his own funds (no premium financing) to purchase the life insurance.
125
Opponents of the amendments tout the infringement of property rights as
reason to dismiss them as over-broad, yet these opponents fail to realize
that property rights are only accorded to good faith purchasers. 126 The
so-called "regulatory net" of the amendments is sufficiently crafted so as
to allow policy owners who have purchased in good faith to sell their
interest without encumbrance. 1
27
b. Insurance Companies Amend Applications to Discover STOLI
at Policy Inception
The NAIC is not the only group concerned with STOLI; most
insurance companies rightly recognize their obligation to prevent this
practice, and have altered their application forms to include questions
regarding the intended use of policies. 128 It remains to be seen if these
changes will reduce the prevalence of STOLI. One potential impediment
to the effectiveness of the alterations stems from the nature of the
relationship between the life insurance companies and the "agents"
selling the policies. Life insurance "agents" are not agents in the legal
sense at all, they are independent contractors, known as "independent
producers" or "brokers" in the industry. 129 This arrangement allows each
broker to sell life insurance policies from several different insurance




126. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
127. For a comprehensive exposition of regulation targeting the practice of STOLI,
see Kenneth W. Kingman & Stephan R. Leimberg, Deterring Stranger-Originated Life
Insurance: Two New Model Life Settlement Acts, EST. PLAN. (forthcoming July 2008).
128. Companies such as Pacific Life, Penn Mutual Life, AXA Equitable Life, MONY
Life, and West Coast Life Insurance have all amended their applications to include
questions about the intended use of the policy and, specifically, whether the insured
intends to sell the policy in a viatical or life settlement transaction. (Unpublished
applications, on file with author).
129. See Gascon Interview I, supra note 119.
130. See Head Interview, supra note 118.
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incentives for impropriety. As with unscrupulous mortgage salesmen,131
brokers are not always willing to forego writing a policy on account of
potential STOLI.132 Further, as the risk of mortgage-defaults is not borne
by the mortgage salesman, 133 STOLI-loss is not borne by the broker, and
in each case, the commission on the loan/policy is theirs to lose.'3 4 It is
difficult to say how best to resolve this incentive-problem, though the
burden seems to rest with the insurers. If insurers are consistent in
terminating their relationships with brokers who write STOLI policies,
brokers will quickly become limited in the products they offer, making
them uncompetitive and ultimately removing the incentive to write a
STOLI policy. Though imposing consequences on the broker may help
abate the practice of STOLI, it cannot be the only solution. A broker
could unknowingly write a STOLI policy, leaving the insurer with the
costly task of detecting STOLI and asserting the lack of insurable interest
defense. 135  Given the current insurable interest laws, the burden of
discovering STOLI, despite costs, seems to rest on the shoulders of the
insurance companies.1
36
B. The Legality of a Life Settlement
Insurance companies are understandably cautious with respect to
life settlements; they are in the business of providing insurance to
individuals, because it is a powerful financial planning tool.137 The sale
of a policy strips from the individual many of the advantages that come
with life insurance, putting insurance companies in a precarious position
131. See, e.g., Annette Haddad, Mortgage Broker Group Takes on Issue of
'Predatory' Lending, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at C2.
132. Head Interview, supra note 118.
133. See The Economist Special Report, On Credit Watch, THE ECONOMIST (U.S.
Ed.), Oct. 20, 2007, http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story-
id=9972531.
134. Gascon Interview I, supra note 119.
There has always been an adversarial relationship between agents and home
offices. Agents are independent producers, not employees, who may have
contracts to sell insurance products from several insurance companies. If an
agent violates his duty to an insurer, the insurer will terminate his contract.
But, if an agent violates a duty to a client, the client can take him to court.
Clearly, in the agent's eyes, the higher obligation goes to the client.
Theoretically, these obligations should be coextensive, but so far, that has not
been the case.
Id.
135. See discussion supra Part I1.A. 1.
136. See infra note 146.
137. Gascon Interview I, supra note 119.
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between advocating against life settlements' 38 and promoting a product
in which they do not believe. Aside from determining whether a life
settlement is in the best interest of a client, insurance companies and
legislators 39 must determine if a life settlement is a legal transaction.
1. Understanding the Insurable Interest Requirement in Light of
Life Settlements
a. The Origins of Insurable Interest
The concept of life insurance was initially rejected by many
members of the population as immoral. 140  Although the importance of
life insurance is now readily apparent because of its ability to hedge
against the risk of unexpected death, many viewed it as little more than
gambling.1 41 In Britain, life insurance contracts were purchased on the
lives of prominent individuals in poor health or individuals being tried
for capital crimes, a practice known as "death pooling."'' 42  In 1774,
however, the British Parliament enacted the first Life Insurance Act,
which required that life insurance policies have insurable interest in order
to be valid. 143  The Life Insurance Act made it a crime to use life
138. Head Interview, supra note 118 ("Insurance companies' efforts to prohibit, ban,
even fire people who engage in assisting clients with appropriate settlements are terrible.
This is a gag-rule--called such in New York.").
139. Letter from Richard Neal & Phil English, Chairman and Ranking Member of
Select Revenue Measures Subcomm. of H. Comm. On Ways and Means, to Henry
Paulson, Sec. of the Treas. (Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://www.naifa.org/
advocacy/frontline/advocacyupdates/documents/1 1.16.07LetterRepsNealEnglish.pdf
(recommending the Treasury issue a "Notice" outlining tax consequences of STOLI).
140. See VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 45-46 (Colum. Univ. Press 1979).
In the minds of many, life insurance was simply a new speculative fund-raising
device to substitute the floundering lotteries and the unsuccessful tontines. Its
alleged lottery spirit became a major source of prejudice against it ... early
forms of life insurance were outright bets on human lives . . . in eighteenth-
century England, insurance and wagering went hand in hand, and it has been
alleged that no form of gambling became so varied, so universal, so wasteful or
so demoralising as insurance.
Id. (internal quotes omitted).
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 20-24
(LexisNexis 3d ed. 2002); Laura Pederson-Pieterson, Minding Your Business; The Ghoul
Pool: Morbid, Tasteless and Popular, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at 12.
143. The act is known as the Life Assurance Act 1774, and it is still in effect in the
United Kingdom to this day. 12 Geo. III, c. 48, 1 (1774) (Eng.). It provides:
From and after the passing of this Act no insurance shall be made by any
person or persons ... on the life or lives of any person ... wherein the
person ... on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, shall have
no interest, or by way of gaming or wagering.
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insurance as a form of gambling. 44  By the mid-nineteenth century,
nearly every state in the United States had enacted insurable interest
laws, and it remains a state-governed matter today. 45  Simply stated,
insurable interest laws are designed to deal with the nature of the
relationship between the policy owner and the person whose life has
been insured.
b. How Courts Define Insurable Interest
Although each state has its own insurable interest law, 14 6 the
Supreme Court has generally defined insurable interest as the
"reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of
[the insured's] life, 147 and "the essential thing is that the policy shall be
obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculating upon the
hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest."'' 48  Stated
Id.
144. Id.
145. See statutes cited infra note 146; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
146. ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(F) (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(A) (2007); ARIz.
REv. STAT. § 20-1104(A) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(A) (2007); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10110.1 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-115 (2007); 18 DEL. CODE ANN.
§ 2704(A) (2007); D.C. CODE § 31-4716 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 627.551(2) (2007); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(E) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-204 (2007); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 41-1804(1) (2007); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/224.1 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-
3-8 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-450(A) (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040(2)
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:613 (2007); 24-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (2007);
MD. CODE ANN., INSURANCE § 12-201(A) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS § 500.2207(1)
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2207 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 61A.074 (2007); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(1) (2007); MONT. CODE ANNO. § 33-15-201(1) (2005); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-704 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.040(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 408:2 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:35-11(2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-4(A)
(2007); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(B) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-58-70, 58-58-86 (2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(1) (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3911.09, 3911.091
(2008); 36 OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 36, § 3604(A)(1) (2007); ORE. REV. STAT. §743.024(1)
(2005); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 512 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(A) (2007);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-100 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-3 (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-7-101(A) (2007); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1103.053 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-21-104(1) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.18.030(1) (2007); W. VA. CODE R. § 33-6-2(A) (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.07(1)
(2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(A) (2007). Both Massachusetts and Connecticut
rejected the British Life Assurance Act of 1774, electing instead to leave insurable
interest requirements within the province of common law. See Loomis v. Eagle Life Ins.
Co., 72 Mass. 396, 398 (Mass. 1856) ("The case in this state must be governed by the
rules and principles of the common law, there being no regulation of the subject by
statute"); Bevin v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244, 251 (Conn. 1854)
(noting that Britain's Gambling Act principles, 12 Geo. III, c. 48, 1(1774) (Eng.), were
"in affirmance" of the principle of common law).
147. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
148. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).
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differently, insurable interest is found when an individual has a greater
interest in the survival of the insured than in the insured's death.
149
c. The Dual Policy Rationales Underlying the Insurable Interest
Laws
The dual policy rationales underlying this doctrine are as follows:
first, to prevent wagering on human life and second, to prevent those
individuals who would bring about the premature death of the insured
from acquiring an interest in another's life. 150 Insurable interest ensures
that life insurance is used to provide security to loved ones or creditors in
the event of an untimely death, not as a wagering contract on human
life. 151  Insurable interest acts as a safeguard against speculating on
human life, such that insurance on the life of another may only be held
by one whose interest in the continued life of the insured individual is
greater than his interest in the death of the insured. 152 Insurable interest
also hedges against unnecessary risk to human life. By limiting the class
of persons who might be tempted to place a wager on life, the insurable
interest requirement decreases the chances of crimes inspired by such a
wager. 1
53
In addition to requiring insurable interest, many states have enacted
additional statutes which will trump a beneficiary's right to the death
benefit under an insurance contract in the event of a "modification by
circumstance," e.g., slaying. 154 For example, "slayer statutes" protect an
insured from a beneficiary's potential incentive to kill the insured for his
death benefit. 155 These statutes are grounded in the equitable principle
that a wrongdoer should not profit from his crime, thereby keeping the
slayer from collecting the death benefits of an insurance policy. 1
5 6
149. Id. (holding that an applicant for a life insurance policy on the life of another has
an insurable interest in that other's life only if he has a pecuniary interest in the continued
life of the person whose life he seeks to insure).
150. See Leimberg, supra note 99 at § 4; ZARITSKY & LEIMBERG, supra note 26.
151. Id.
152. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U.S. 498, 505 (1883).
153. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911).
154. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.802 (2007) (revoking slayer's interest in the death
benefits of a life insurance policy of slain decedent on account of slayer's act of felonious
and intentional killing of the decedent).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 598 (1886) (holding
that a beneficiary of an insurance policy could not collect insurance proceeds after
feloniously killing the insured).
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d. Who Generally Has Insurable Interest
An individual has an insurable interest in his own life and in the
lives of others with whom he has a particular relationship.1 57 Insurable
interest in the life of another encompasses close familial relationships,
e.g., blood affinity, whether or not "capable of pecuniary estimation,"'
' 58
as well as those relationships with demonstrable economic dependencies,
including but not limited to key employees of a corporation, business
partners, or those in a debtor-creditor relationship.1 59  Generally, with
respect to insurable interest in the life of a close family member, the
insurance protection sought is not restricted to a certain dollar amount.
160
In contrast, a creditor has insurable interest in the life of his debtor only
to the extent of the amount of the debt.
161
When an individual wishes to procure life insurance on the life of
another, he must possess an insurable interest in the proposed insured's
life or the policy will be void. 162 The purpose of the insurable interest
requirement is to ensure that life insurance is purchased for a proper use
and not as a form of wagering on human life. 163 A salient point for the
life settlement industry, however, is that when an individual procures life
157. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876) (outlining
history of insurable interest and noting insurable interest is found when individuals are
connected by certain relationships).
158. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
159. See United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195 (1924)
(holding a company had an insurable interest in life of president); Conn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 94 U.S. at 461 (determining that a creditor may obtain insurance on the life of his
debtor for the purpose of securing his debt).
160. An individual is said to have "unlimited insurable interest in his own life." Mut.
Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Noah, 282 So. 2d 271, 273 (Ala. 1973). Yet, just because an
individual has unlimited insurable interest in his life does not mean he has unlimited
economic interest in his life. See Gascon Interview I, supra note 119. Insurance
companies limit the maximum life insurance coverage available to an individual by a
formula that includes, where applicable, current income, estate tax liability plus annual
growth (usually equal to three to six percent per year for ten years), reasonable business
liability (key-person insurance, executive benefit plans funded with life insurance, debt
reduction, buyout agreement funding, etc.). Id.
161. See Cammack v. Lewis, 82 U.S. 643, 648 (1872) ("[Creditor] could, in equity
and good conscience, only hold the policy as a security for what [debtor] owed him when
it was assigned, and such advances as he might afterwards make on account of it, and that
the assignment of the policy to him was only valid to that extent.").
162. There is a split among courts on whether the insured individual need be informed
that one with insurable interest in his life is purchasing insurance. Compare Ellison v.
Straw, 92 N.W. 1094, 1097 (Wis. 1902) (ruling policies obtained without consent are
valid as long as there is insurable interest) and Cook v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 406
S.E.2d 848, 851 (N.C. 1991) (same) with Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d
362, 365 (S.C. 1964) (holding policies obtained without consent of insured are void as
contrary to public policy).
163. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 614 A.2d 96, 98 (Md. 1992) (noting primary purpose of
insurable interest is to prevent wagering).
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insurance on his own life, he may designate anyone he chooses as the
beneficiary of the policy without regard to insurable interest. 164  The
general logic is that the insured is in the best position to determine the
risk he is willing to assume, and the insured will probably not designate
an individual who is likely to kill him.' 
65
e. When Insurable Interest is Necessary
State law governs when insurable interest is required. 166 Typically,
life insurance requires that an insurable interest be present only at the
creation of the policy; 67 this principle is rooted in the common law, and
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 168 The primary rationale for requiring
insurable interest only at policy creation, and not at the time the loss is
suffered, is that life insurance does more than merely indemnify against a
risk.169  While life insurance is a capital asset, 70 an investment
mechanism' 7 1 and a powerful estate-planning tool, 72 the prevailing
purpose of life insurance is to provide security. 73 Understanding what
164. See Clements v. Terrell, 145 S.E. 78, 81 (Ga. 1928) (stating an individual may
designate as beneficiary an individual who has no insurable interest).
165. See Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement For Life Insurance:
A Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 477, 487 (2005).
166. See statutes cited supra note 146.
167. Opponents of the life settlement industry may want to assert that insurable
interest ought to exist at both policy inception and at collection of death benefits. There
is some state statute support for this notion as well, see IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-3-8
(2007); however, in the opinion of the author, insurable interest is proper only at policy
inception. To find otherwise would result in arbitrary line-drawing with respect to
beneficiary designation and face value of policies.
168. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 463 (1876) (relying on
English precedent and holding policy valid despite cessation of insurable interest).
169. See Gascon Interview I, supra note 119 ("Life insurance is more than an
indemnity contract; it is also a vital estate-planning tool."). Contrast life insurance with
property insurance, where the purpose is to merely insure against loss of that property.
Cf Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase, 72 U.S. 509, 512 (1866) (stating property insurance is
an indemnity contract, if insured has no interest for which he can be indemnified, the
contract is void as contrary to public policy).
170. I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2008) ("For purposes of this subtitle, the term capital asset
means property held by the taxpayer [whether or not connected with his trade or
business].") (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added). Though there are statutory
exclusions to this provision, life insurance is not excluded. This is significant, because as
a capital asset, life insurance policies are property. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149,
156 (1911); see also discussion infra Part III.B.2.
171. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of the multiple uses of life insurance, see LEIMBERG & DOYLE,
JR., supra note 26. See also, John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1115 (1984) (outlining the
reasons for will substitutes such as life insurance).
173. Robert H. Jerry, II, May Harvey Rest in Peace: Lakin v. Postal Life and Casualty
Company, 2 NEV. L.J. 292, 305 (2002) ("For individuals, insurance makes possible the
preservation of work and accumulated savings, the maintenance of lifestyles and
[Vol. 113:1
AN INVESTMENT TO DIE FOR
the security (cash death benefit) really affords is perhaps the key to
understanding the reason insurable interest is only required at the
creation of the policy.
The security afforded by life insurance is intended to hedge against
losses suffered when an individual dies. 174 Measuring actual pecuniary
loss in the event of death is no easy task. 175 In addition to quantifiable
losses (funeral expenses, lost wages, etc.), intangible losses and future
pecuniary losses are far more difficult to approximate. 176 For instance, a
parent has an insurable interest in the life of a child despite the fact that
the parent is not financially dependant upon the child. 177 On the occasion
of the untimely death of the child, the parent may collect the death
benefit without establishing actual pecuniary losses that amount to the
value of the death benefit. 178  Thus, life insurance stands in
contradistinction to property insurance where an individual may not
maintain insurance on property in which he has no insurable interest.
179
f. What Insurable Interest Laws Mean for Life Settlements
The insurable interest laws do not pose a problem for a legitimate,
non-STOLI, life settlement. The insurable interest laws ensure that those
prosperity, and the realization of future dreams that would be dashed by unexpected loss
but for the presence of insurance.").
174. See, e.g., Foster v. Hurley, 826 N.E.2d 719, 727 (Mass. 2005) (noting the
primary purpose of life insurance is to provide security).
175. See, e.g., Carter v. Williams, 792 A.2d 1093, 1097 (Me. 2002) (noting the
inherent difficulty of measuring pecuniary loss in the event of death).
176. Id.
177. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
178. To draw an analogy to tort law, note that recovery is permitted for the death of a
child in a wrongful death action. See Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 212 (N.J. 1980)
("[A] verdict finding no damages for the death of a child should ordinarily be set aside by
the trial court.... To sustain such a verdict would result in a return to the outmoded
doctrine that a child is a liability-not an asset." (citing Bohrman v. Pa. R. Co., 93 A.2d
190, 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952))). Likewise, perhaps insurable interest
implicitly recognizes that prospective loss, pecuniary or not, may properly be insured
against. For example, the court in Green v. Bittner noted specifically that damages
"should not be limited to the well-known elements of pecuniary loss," and instead noted
that loss of companionship, advice and future care of parents in old age should be
considered by the jury. Id. The holding in Green demonstrates the difficulty in the
valuation of life. By contrast, property is generally not as difficult to value, and so
property insurance does require actual quantifiable loss at the time the claim is made.
This means that in the case of property insurance, financial loss suffered by the insured
because of the relationship (insurable interest) that existed between the insured and his
property, is a prerequisite to collecting the insurance benefit.
179. See Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase, 72 U.S. 509, 512 (1866) (stating property
insurance is an indemnity contract, where insured has no personal interest for which he
can be indemnified, contract is void as contrary to public policy, and noting such a
contract would create an interest in the destruction of property).
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who seek to purchase a policy on the life of another only do so with the
proper intent. 80 That is, the policy purchaser intends to protect against
the risk of death and is not wagering on mortality.' 81 If the policy is
purchased when a legitimate insurable interest exists, then the holder
should not be presumed to be participating in an illegal wagering
contract. 182
Opponents of life settlements may argue that insurable interest must
exist at both creation of the life insurance policy and at collection of the
death benefit. 83  Seemingly, this argument makes sense given the
concerns of public policy. For, if lack of insurable interest is the
hallmark of a forbidden wagering contract, then subsequent cessation of
insurable interest should void an interest in a life insurance policy, thus
preserving the policy goals. This was the position taken by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Russell v. Grigsby, before it was reversed
by the Supreme Court. 1
84
In Grigsby, the Supreme Court did not overrule the insurable
interest requirement completely, but merely limited it. The Court implies
two arguments against voiding a policy when insurable interest ceases.
First, the Court held that though an individual lacking insurable interest
could not purchase an interest in the life of another, one who had
purchased a policy with proper insurable interest could then assign the
interest to an individual who lacked insurable interest. 85  The Court
noted that the danger of granting "a general license to all to insure whom
they like" is very different from the specific assignment found in
Grigsby.186 This is analogous to the designation of beneficiaries; an
insured may choose his beneficiary, and the beneficiary need not have
insurable interest.1 87  Likewise, an insured may choose to whom he
assigns his policy, and likely will not select an individual whom he
believes would bring about his early demise. The Court's opinion
suggests that the power to vest another with an interest in one's death is
left to the individual and not the government.
180. See, e.g., Herman v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 529, 535 (2d Cir.
1989) (remanding case for determination of whether insurable interest existed at the time
the life insurance policy was taken out, and indicating the intent of the party was critical).
181. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911).
182. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 614 A.2d 96, 98 (Md. 1992).
183. See Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1909), rev'd, Grigsby v.
Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
184. Id.
185. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Clements v. Terrell, 145 S.E. 78, 81 (Ga. 1928) (holding that an
individual may designate as beneficiary one who has no insurable interest).
[Vol. 113:1
AN INVESTMENT TO DIE FOR
Second, the Court noted that life insurance was more than a mere
indemnity contract and, as a result, cessation of insurable interest by
assignment does not void the policy.'88 Life insurance is one of the "best
recognized forms of investment and selfcompelled [sic] saving;' ' 89 to
restrict assignment to those who had insurable interest would "diminish
appreciably the value of the contract in the owner's hands."' 90 Given
that the asset underlying the contract of assignment was a property right
(contract rights to the death benefit payment obligation), the Court held
that upholding the assignment, despite cessation of insurable interest,
was necessary to give life insurance the ordinary characteristic of
property-free alienability.
A life insurance policy is an asset and, as with all assets, there may
come a time when they do not hold the same value that they once did.
Allowing an individual to sell his policy and, in return, gain a cash
benefit, affirms his property rights and enhances the utility of his
policy.' 9' As long as there was insurable interest when the policy was
created, the policy can be sold on the secondary market and remain valid
despite a subsequent lack of insurable interest. 92 As with beneficiary
designation, the insured is vested with the right to assume the risk of a
third party holding an interest in his death. 193 The question then arises:
as a society, do we really want to allow an individual to alienate this
interest?
188. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 157.
189. Id. at 156.
190. Id.
191. Head Interview, supra note 118.
The Life Insurance Companies have long held their policy-owners captive. A
life settlement turns the tables on the companies and gives consumers another
option. This option of a life settlement will force insurance companies to
become more competitive and to offer their policy-owners the best options
available. After all, the agent owes fiduciary duties to their clients; if a life
settlement policy makes sense, there is no reason an agent should be inhibited
from offering that option to a client.
Id.
192. See Bersch v. VanKleeck, 334 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Wis. 1983) (applying
Wisconsin law, court recognizes general rule that the rights of a beneficiary are not
"automatically affected" by a divorce).
193. The law permits a policy owner to designate a policy beneficiary who may or
may not have insurable interest. See, e.g., Am. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469, 471 (10th
Cir. 1964) (noting that in absence of contrary statute, insured was free to designate any
beneficiary he "saw fit" regardless of insurable interest); Ducros v. Comm'r, 272 F.2d 49,
50 (6th Cir. 1959) ("[A]n individual taking out insurance on his own life has a right to
designate anyone he chooses as his beneficiary, irrespective of whether such beneficiary
has an insurable interest in his life."). Likewise, a policy owner may elect to devise his
rights in the policy to an individual who also lacks insurable interest. Grigsby, 222 U.S.
at 157.
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2. Market Alienability of Life Insurance
a. A Life Settlement is the Sale of an Economic Interest in a Life
The freedom to alienate is an important "stick" in the "bundle" of
property rights. 194 As discussed, and not surprisingly, the Supreme Court
has upheld the right to alienate a life insurance policy. 195 It is unlikely
that the Court's decision will change any time soon, 196 but the issue is
whether it is proper to allow unrestricted alienation of life insurance.
A life insurance contract, unlike a stock or a bond, is valued
according to the mortality of the insured, effectually making it a
longevity-derivative. 97 By selling a life insurance policy, the seller is
actually selling an interest in the life of the insured. Only when the
insured dies will the investor recover on his investment, and the sooner
the insured dies, the greater the return on the investment will be.' 98
The government has determined that there are certain goods and
"property rights" which are simply inalienable.199 Acting in the public's
interest, the government substitutes its judgment for that of the populace
(paternalism), and determines that certain things are just not salable.2 °°
These restrictions are generally justified in light of preserving the well-
being of society. 201 Arguably, the government regulates not to restrict
194. Though the source of this metaphor is unclear, it is used to help explain how
ownership in a single piece of property (the bundle) can have separate rights (the sticks),
one of which is the right to transfer, either by gift or sale, one's interest in the property.
195. See Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 157.
196. There is some authority that suggests that a change in the insurable interest of the
policy owner (as would be with a policy sale) is distinct from the designation of a
beneficiary lacking insurable interest. See Roundtree v. Frazee, 209 So.2d 424, 426 (Ala.
1968) (holding an assignment of a policy is not the same as designation of beneficiary);
The Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, 121-22 (1872) (holding no one should
hold an interest in the life of another if he lacks insurable interest in that life, and it makes
no difference if the policy was acquired by purchase and assignment or from insurer
directly). In the opinion of the author, the distinction ought to be between good faith
purchase and STOLI.
197. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § l(c)(13) (2008) ("[A] derivative contract means
generally a financial contract whose value is derived from the values of one or more
underlying assets, reference rates or indexes of asset values."). A life insurance contract
derives its value from the mortality of the insured.
198. See sources cited supra note 54.
199. For the purposes of this Comment, "alienation" will be understood to mean
salable in the market.
200. For example, Cuban cigars, human organs or blood, recreational drugs, marital
support rights or infants are inalienable.
201. To say that something is inalienable in the market place is not to say that the
ownership interest cannot be transferred through other means, such as by gift. See
Benjamin Hippen, The Case for Kidney Markets, NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2006, at 47. In
fact, certain property rights, like blood donations, are encouraged to be gifted because of
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freedom, but to enhance it and benefit society as a whole. °2 Perhaps, in
certain contexts, the alienability of life insurance should also be subject
to the paternalistic exercise of regulation.
On the other hand, allowing life settlements to be freely transacted
creates a more efficient market for consumers.0 3 Continued growth in
the life settlement industry will likely result in an increase of market
participants, and an increase in market participants means more
competition.20 4 With more investors bidding for the interests in available
life insurance policies, the prices offered for settlements will increase.
The relationship between price and quantity is a basic supply and
demand relationship. An increase in the value of settlement offers is
cash in the pockets of seniors looking to sell their policies.
b. A Life Settlement May Benefit an Investor More than the
Seller of the Policy
Selling an interest in one's life is arguably risky business. Our
insurable interest laws are proof of legislators' desire to prevent
wagering contracts on human life.205 As discussed above,2 °6 however,
when an individual has legitimately entered into an insurance contract
with no intent to resell the contract to someone lacking insurable interest,
he should have the freedom to later decide to sell his interest in the
restrictions on salability. See generally, Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
202. One may contend that any paternalistic justification for a restriction on one's
personal rights is an infringement on personal freedom. There are, however, certain
concepts which are understood to be necessary for society to flourish. For example, an
individual has a right (freedom) to do as he pleases, but he may not commit a crime with
impunity. There is a restriction of his freedom by saying that he is not free to commit a
crime; however, in order to maintain order in society, this is a necessary restriction of
freedom. Another illustration of this is the principle that one cannot consent to be
murdered. See, e.g., In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Cal. 1983)
(acknowledging that assisting a suicide is a felony); Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App.
4th 1614, 1619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating decedent had no constitutional right to an
assisted suicide and could not consent to murder). Extended back further, one arrives at
the concept of negative liberty, where an individual must, for the sake of society, cede his
personal freedoms to the state. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 2, 15 (John Jay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., Signet 1961) (1787) ("Nothing is more certain than the indispensable
necessity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is
instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with
requisite powers.").
203. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
2705, 2728, 168 L. Ed. 2d 623, 651 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting new entry into
a market may bring increased competition with the net effect benefiting consumers).
204. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS, 238 (W.W. Norton &
Co. Ltd. 3d ed. 1992).
205. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
206. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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contract to a third-party. °7 Case law clearly supports this practice, so
the real concern over life settlements seems to be elusive. According to
Doug Head of the Life Insurance Settlement Association ("LISA"),0 9 the
life insurance companies fear change.
There are some people who don't want to see the client as anything
but a captive to the company. The assumption was that once a
customer was captured, he is [the company's] forever, but now [life
settlements give] consumers a way out. Now life insurance
companies will have to compete more.
If Mr. Head is correct, then permitting unrestricted life settlement
transactions would be in the public's best interest, because it will
diminish the monopsony power of the insurance companies.
211
On the other hand, unrestricted salability of life insurance policies
has the potential to negatively impact society as a whole. The prevalence
of life settlements, and the potential for STOLI, has already caused some
insurance companies to raise premium rates on the senior bracket.212
With an increase in premium rates, individuals who would otherwise
procure insurance for legitimate purposes may be dissuaded from doing
so. If policy principles are to encourage individuals to have insurance,
then maybe restricting life settlement transactions could be justified on
the ground that life settlements are creating a barrier for individuals to
acquire life insurance. Another possible "side-effect" of an increase in
life settlements is an unduly tempting offer to sell a policy, leaving
families without the security that life insurance affords.
The fact remains that life insurance provides many positive
benefits. 213 Selling off the right to those benefits could be short-sighted
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 157.
209. "The mission of the Life Insurance Settlement Association is to promote the
development, integrity and reputation of the life settlement industry and to promote a
competitive market for the people it serves." LISAAssociation.org, Welcome to the Life
Insurance Settlement Association, http://www.lisassociation.org/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2008).
210. Head Interview, supra note 118.
211. See Ron Panko, A Matter of Trust; Financial Planning; Insurance Market, A.M.
BESTWIRE, Dec. 1, 2002, at 22 ("Until recent years, life insurance policies were bound by
a monopsony, in which there was only one buyer for the instrument. If a consumer
wished to sell a life insurance policy, the only buyer was the company that originally sold
it.").
212. See Goldstein, supra note 118 (noting AIG, the world's largest insurer, has
"hiked" premiums for customers over seventy, in effort to reduce the likelihood a policy
will be STOLI).
213. Telephone Interview with Stephan R. Leimberg, Esq., CEO, Leimberg
Information Services Inc., President, Leimberg Associates, Inc., in Havertown, Pa., and
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on the part of the insured. More importantly, once an insured sells his
policy, he may be precluded from obtaining another one. 214 For many, a
life settlement makes no financial sense, but it should not be the
government's role to prevent individuals from making bad investment
decisions.
c. Caveat Emptor; A Life Settlement is Lawful, but Should Be
Entered Into with Extreme Caution
A life settlement transaction is a valid exercise of an individual's
property rights,21 5 and the transaction should be allowed; however, a life
settlement may not be a prudent financial decision for everyone. Perhaps
only a very narrow slice of the potential market for life settlements
would truly benefit from this sort of transaction. For the government to
restrict alienation of a policy in order to "protect" individuals from
making a bad investment choice, however, would be to over-step the
bounds of the free market.216 In the opinion of the author, the owner, and
not the government, is in the better position to calculate investment risk.
Perhaps the better solution, then, is consumer education. An
individual should not only understand that he is selling an interest in life,
but also that a life settlement may have an unfavorable financial impact.
Presently, life settlement companies require consent of the insured to sell
the interest in the policy. 2 7 Although this requirement is a start, more is
needed. When life settlement pools are securitized, the process is
essentially unregulated because the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC"), whose authority over securitized life settlement pools is
uncertain, currently has no regulatory oversight of the life settlement-
backed security issuance.218 Until the states and courts decide what to do
author of numerous books and articles on life insurance, life settlements, and insurable
interest (Oct. 6, 2007).
If life insurance is such a good deal for investors, why not buy it and keep it for
your family? At the least, policy owners should insist on a "hold" (keep) or
"fold" (sell) analysis that ascertains if there is a need, the extent of that need,
and alternative means of financing needed insurance-before selling an
existing policy on your life to strangers.
Id.
214. See sources cited supra note 160.
215. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.c.
216. See, e.g., Global Economics: Hearing of the H. Comm. of Banking and Financial
Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul, Member, House Comm. of
Financial Serv.) ("[W]e have a great deal of faith and confidence in freedom, free choices
and capitalism.").
217. See VIATICAL SETrLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 9(A)(5) (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs 2006).
218. See SEC v. Life Partners, 102 F.3d 587, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a life
settlement fails prong three of the Howey test for an investment contract, which requires
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with this issue, an individual interested in life settlements ought to
proceed with extraordinary caution.
C. Considerations Before Selling a Life Insurance Policy
1. Understanding the Tax Consequences for Life Settlements;
Life Settlements are Distinct from Viaticals Under the Code
An individual contemplating a life settlement must understand the
potential tax consequences 21 9 of such a transaction.220  Neither the IRC
nor policy rationale supports exclusion of the proceeds from a life
settlement transaction from federal income taxation .22  The amount
realized from the sale should be treated as a disposition of property with
all of the applicable tax consequences. 2
profits of a security to be dependent upon the efforts of others; noting that the profits are
dependent upon the mortality of the insured and not an on-going common enterprise).
But see SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343-44 (1 1th Cir. 2004)
(declining to follow the court's "bright-line rule" in Life Partners, and instead holding
viatical settlements are investment contracts under the Howey test), aff d, 408 F.3d 737
(1 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 17, 168 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2007).
219. According to Diana Helfgott and Anna Petinova of the IRS, life settlement
taxation is just now coming under review. Because the auditing process takes several
years, the Service is just now getting into the years where life settlement transactions are
in the tax returns. Life Insurance Securitizations Will Become Subject to Closer Study,
IRS Officials Said, [Jan.-June] Fed. Tax & Accounting Rep. (BNA) No. 198, at G-5 (Oct.
15, 2007).
220. The author neither endorses nor discourages a life settlement transaction. A life
settlement should be approached with caution and counsel; whether it is the best decision
for an individual is dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances.
221. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2008) ("[G]ross income does not include amounts received
(whether in single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are
paid by reason of the death of the insured.") (emphasis added).
222. There is uneasiness in the insurance industry that because life settlements
inherently change the character of insurance, an increase in the participation of these
transactions will spoil the preferred tax treatment of I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) for all those
insured. Though it is possible that Congress would step in and over-regulate the industry
by removing the preferred tax treatment of insurance because of the abuse that is possible
through a life settlement, it would make no sense. The abuse possible in the life
settlement industry is no different than other forms of fraud possible in the insurance
industry. By punishing all insured individuals for potential abuse by a small sub-set of
the insured population, Congress would effectually provide a disincentive to procure
insurance, and this is simply not in accord with public policy. The better solution is two-
fold: First, find ways to motivate insurers to be more effective discerners of fraud at the
front-end of the transaction or, in other words, when the policy is created. Second, treat
insurance policies that have become solely investment vehicles (as evidenced by a life
settlement transaction) as a disposition of property, taxable as income under the
provisions of I.R.C. § 1001 (2008).
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Public policy promotes life insurance because it provides security in
the event of death.223 For this reason, the Code affords special tax
treatment to the death benefits of life insurance.224 A life settlement,
however, changes the character of the income derived from the life
insurance policy.22 5 Income received from a life settlement transaction is
not received on account of the death of the insured.226
One could argue that because the proceeds from a viatical
settlement are not paid by reason of the death of the insured, life
settlement transactions should also enjoy the same tax-treatment by
analogy. Presumably, the disparate tax treatment is because the IRS does
not believe an individual is willing to die in order to take advantage of a
tax shelter. In the case of a viatical settlement, under which the insured
has been declared terminal,227 the terminal status of the insured allows
the income from the viatical settlement to be excluded from gross
income as an amount paid by reason of the death of the insured. 228 This
Code provision creates a legal fiction, but the fiction is necessary to
promote a public purpose, that of getting cash into the hands of an
individual who may have great need of it. 22 9 Like a viatical settlement, a
life settlement is a devise of the security afforded by the policy in
exchange for a present cash benefit.230 Unlike a viatical settlement,
however, the policy owner in a life settlement transaction is not
231terminally ill, thus explaining the unequal tax treatment.
223. The Supreme Court underscored the policy behind the preferred tax treatment of
life insurance in Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) ("That life insurance is
desirable from an economic and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk
of loss from premature death, is unquestionable.").
224. This differs from other types of insurance, for instance, property/casualty
insurance. To the extent that an individual's personal casualty gain exceeds his adjusted
basis in the lost property, he will pay capital gains tax. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B) (2008).
225. Even if it could be argued that life settlement proceeds should theoretically be
treated as a death benefit, case law is filled with courts' willingness to look past form to
substance. See, e.g., Helvering, 312 U.S. at 540-42 (determining that death benefit was
not excludable from gross income, because insurance policy was entered into solely for
the purpose of avoiding estate taxation).
226. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2008) excludes from gross income "amounts received
(whether in single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are
paid by reason of the death of the insured." I.R.C. § 101(g) (2008) treats the amount
received on account of a viatical settlement as an amount received by reason of the death
of the insured.
227. I.R.C. § 101(g)(2)(A) (2008).
228. Id.
229. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
230. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
231. "[A terminally ill patient is one] who has been certified by a physician as having
an illness or physical condition which can reasonably be expected to result in death in 24
months or less after the date of the certification." I.R.C. § 101(g)(4)(A) (2008)
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2. When Seeking Liquidity, Policy Owners are Not Captive to
Life Settlements-Some Alternatives
A policy owner seeking an immediate benefit from his life
insurance policy is not captive to the life settlement market. An insured
should always consult with his financial advisor for a full appraisal of his
options. Generally, an individual contemplating the sale of a life
insurance policy should take into account the reason that he is interested
in selling. Is the policy owner unable to make the policy payments, and
thus seeks to be relieved of the obligation of premium payments? Or is
he interested in gaining immediate liquidity? Based on the position of
the policy owner, most all life insurance companies have tailored
alternatives to meet the policy holder's needs. While the options
available to a policy owner will vary by the terms of the policy itself, this
section outlines a few of the common alternatives.
232
a. Options if Policy Owner is Having Trouble with Payments
If a policy owner is having trouble making the policy payments,
then there are several options. First, the insured can elect to reduce the
policy's death benefit, which reduces the annual premium payment.233
Second, an insured may elect an option known as a "reduced paid up"
policy, in which the insurance company takes the amount of cash value
accrued in the policy and buys a new policy on a single-premium
basis. 234  The new policy's face value will be reduced from the old
policy, but the insured will have no future premium obligations and the
policy will last for life.235 A third option is to convert a permanent policy
into a term policy. 236  This option allows the owner to stop paying
premiums and begin using the policy's cash accumulation value 237 to
fund future premiums. 8  In this scenario, the policy owner would
232. Each of the options discussed in this subsection were advanced by Robert S.
Gascon, CLU, ChFC, Regional Director of The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, in
a Telephone interview in Irvine, Cal. (Jan. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Gascon Interview II].
They are meant to be illustrative only of options which are presently offered by one
insurance company, The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, and should not be
construed to be either an exhaustive list or a recommendation; depending on the terms of
the policy held, some options may not be available. The options highlighted in this
section are applicable to Whole-Life policies only. Other forms of permanent (cash-
value) policies may have analogous options, not mentioned herein.




237. See sources cited supra note 33.
238. Gascon Interview II, supra note 232.
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maintain the same death benefit, but only for a period of time.23 9 The
policy would eventually lapse due to the lack of premiums and cash
values to sustain it.
240
Another, perhaps more creative, option is to take out a personal loan
or even re-finance a home, if possible, to pay premiums. 241 This option
may serve as a great way to release equity that is gaining virtually zero
interest in favor of a potential death benefit that will be excluded from
gross income242 and more than return the interest payments paid.
Similarly, a policy owner could choose to make a gift of the policy to a
family member who can afford to pay the premiums of the contract.243
From a family-financial-health perspective, life insurance is a valuable
asset to maintain. Any option that would afford the policy holder the
ability to keep the policy in force should be given serious thought.
b. Options if the Policy Holder is in Need of Liquidity
In addition to the above options, several other alternatives may
permit a policy owner to extract a current cash benefit from the policy
without selling his interest. First, if the insured is classified as
,,2424"terminal, ' 44 an insured may acquire an accelerated death benefit.245
Accelerated death benefits work differently from company to company,
but generally they allow the policy owner to receive a significant portion
of the death benefit (sometimes as high as eighty percent) that would
otherwise be paid to the beneficiaries upon the death of the insured.246
Accelerated death benefits are excluded from gross income tax under
IRC § 101(g)(1).2 47 Typically, the balance of the face amount will be
paid to the beneficiaries, less interest, upon the insured's death.248
Two additional options are a policy-loan and partial-cash surrender.
A policy-loan allows a policy owner to borrow against the contract,
239. See id.
240. Once a whole life policy has been so converted, the conversion is irrevocable.
Gascon Interview II, supra note 232.
241. Id.
242. I.R.C. § 101(a) (2008).
243. Gascon Interview II, supra note 232.
244. See I.R.C. § 101(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2008) (providing definition of "terminally ill
insureds").
245. Gascon Interview II, supra note 232.
246. See id.
247. I.R.C. § 101(g)(1) (2008) (treating amounts received under a life insurance
contract on the life of a terminally or chronically ill individual as paid by reason of the
death of the insured); I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2008) (excluding amounts received under a life
insurance contract from gross income if such amounts are paid by reason of the death of
the insured).
248. Gascon Interview II, supra note 232.
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which works similarly to borrowing against equity in a home.2 49 The
loan is excluded from gross income when received, 250 but must be paid
back before the insured dies or the outstanding amount of the loan will
reduce the death benefit.251  A partial-cash surrender allows a policy
owner to withdraw some of the funds that have accumulated in the
investment (cash) portion of the policy. 252 The difference between a loan
against the policy and a partial-surrender is that there is no interest
accrued in a partial surrender,253 but a partially-surrendered policy runs
the risk of lapsing due to insufficient cash reserves remaining in the
policy to sustain it.
254
Far from being formulaic, the alternatives to life settlements must
be carefully considered with a trusted financial advisor. Each
individual's financial picture is unique and a variety of factors will need
to be considered. The original purpose of the life insurance policy, the
current needs and financial state of the policy owner, are just a few of
these factors. In general, the determination will be a two-step analysis.
First, a policy owner will need to determine what his current needs are,
and this must be considered in light of his overall estate plan. Second, a
policy owner must consider the economic consequences both to himself
presently and to his estate, for any change in his insurance coverage.
These same considerations may also be applied to the decision to transact
a life settlement. 5  For example, it may be the case that an insurance
policy is no longer needed, but a life settlement would have tax
consequences and transaction fees which make the settlement too costly
to execute. Only with a full understanding can an individual make wise
financial decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The life settlement industry is a testament to the power of the free
market.256 From life insurance providing a family with security, to
securities which derive their value from mortality, the life settlement
industry is evidence of the spirit of capitalism alive in the American
257economy. An individual's need for insurance may change, and the
value of a life insurance policy to an individual may diminish over time.
249. See id.
250. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(A) (2008).




255. See Stephan R. Leimberg et al., Life Settlements: How to Know When to Hold
and When to Fold, EST. PLAN. (forthcoming Aug. 2008).
256. See discussion supra Parts ILA, III.B.2.
257. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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By enabling life settlement transactions, the freedom inherent in the
American economy is affirmed: the right of free alienation of property.
25 8
The life settlement industry is in accord with case precedent and
common law property rights, 259 and while it may not be a good decision
for many, the right to make a poor or risky investment choice is the
prerogative of the individual, not the government.26°
As with many markets, the pitfalls of abuse and fraud will plague
the industry, but proper regulation may ameliorate the pervasiveness of
these problems.261  Finding ways to encourage the full use and
application of the insurable interest laws in discovering STOLI at policy
application is of paramount importance.262 Imposing strict criminal
sanctions on those who willingly engage in insurance fraud, in any form,
is essential to stabilizing the industry.263
Sophisticated financial models for risk calculation, both of STOLI
and mortality expectation, are necessary for the life settlement-backed
security market to thrive. 264 Reliable models for risk calculation will
enable credit-rating agencies to confidently grade the life settlement-
265backed securities, further enhancing consumer confidence in the
investment.266 With possible regulatory oversight of the SEC, the market
for these securities will be further protected.267
While a potentially lucrative option, a life settlement must be
carefully evaluated by an individual policy owner.268 A life settlement is
the sale of a contract, the contract right to a death benefit, 269 which
means the purchaser of a life insurance policy profits only when the
insured dies.270 This risk must be fully appreciated by the insured. The
tax implications for a life settlement transaction are also unclear, though
the proceeds from a life settlement are all but certainly included in gross
income. 27 The maintenance of a life insurance policy for estate planning
purposes or otherwise brings many benefits, and a policy owner ought to
consider each option available under his policy before determining to sell
258. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
259. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
260. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
261. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, III.A.4.
262. See supra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 105-15.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
268. See discussion supra Parts III.B.2.c, III.C.
269. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
271. See discussion supra Part III.C. 1.
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his interest.272 Most importantly, the policy owner must realize that he is
not captive to any market-insurance company or life settlement. An
individual has the freedom to engage in the transaction that makes sense
to him personally, and that is a benefit that, so far, there is no way to sell.
272. See discussion supra Part II.C.2; see also supra note 213 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 113:1
